专利商业化中隐性知识共享动态演化博弈研究
杨湘浩1，叶旭1，刘云2，王小黎3,4
（1.上海工程技术大学管理学院，上海201620；
2.中国科学院大学公共政策与管理学院，北京100049；
3.北京理工大学管理与经济学院，北京100081；
4.中原工学院经济管理学院，河南 郑州451191）
摘要：加强专利商业化中隐性知识共享，对挖掘我国专利价值潜力，加快我国从专利大国转向专利强国具有重要意义。本文在“主体有限理性的”基础上，选取发明人积极性、企业接受能力、信誉效应和两阶段付款合同等关键影响变量，构建了发明人、企业、专利中介的多方动态演化博弈模型，并应用复制动态方程和MATLAB软件仿真，探讨上述因素对专利商业化中隐性知识共享的影响。研究结果表明：发明人积极性与企业知识接受能力相匹配时，有助于专利商业化中隐性知识共享，尤其是高积极性和高知识接受能力匹配；完善的市场信誉评价体系能够促进专利商业化中隐性知识共享；同时两阶段合同中不同的阶段付款比例也对专利商业化中隐性知识共享产生重要影响。
关键词：专利商业化；隐性知识共享；演化博弈；两阶段合同
主要研究结论：本文对专利商业化过程中隐性知识共享行为开展了研究，构建了发明人、企业和专利中介三方动态演化博弈模型，研究发现：（1）在专利商业化过程中，发明人积极性和企业知识接受能力相匹配时，有助于专利商业化中隐性知识共享，尤其是高积极性和高知识接受能力组合时，效果更好；（2）完善的市场信誉评价体系能够促进专利商业化中隐性知识共享；（3）不同付款比例的两阶段合同对发明人和企业的行为决策产生重要影响。
Research on the dynamic evolution game of tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization
Yang Xianghao1, Ye Xu1, Liu Yun2, Wang Xiaoli3,4
(1. School of Management Studies, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai 201620, China;
2. School of Public Policy and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;
3. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China;
4. School of Economics and Management, Zhongyuan University of Technology, Zhengzhou 451191, Henan, China)
Abstract:Patent commercialization plays an important role in realizing patents′ economic benefits and social value. However, in the existing research, there is little attention on tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization. Strengthening tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization is of great significance for digging out the potential value of patents and accelerating the transformation from quantity to quality for patents in China.
Assuming all participants are bounded rational, this paper selects some important variables about inventors′ activeness, enterprises′ accepting capability, reputation effect, and two-stage payment contract. By these variables, it designs a dynamic evolving game model involving three key subjects: inventors, enterprises, and intermediaries. In addition, it analyzes and explores the impacts of these factors on tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization by replication dynamic equations and simulations implemented by MATLAB software. In conclusions, the paper indicates that it improves tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization if inventors′ activeness is well matched with enterprises′ accepting capability, especially high activeness of inventors is matched with high accepting capability of enterprises. Besides a good evaluation system of reputation is also one of efficient measures to improve tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization. And a different payment percentage in a two-stage contract also plays a significant role in the tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization. Accordingly, the following countermeasures are proposed:
First, the construction of patent trading platform should be strengthened. The database in patent trading platform should be improved to save all key information of participants, keep track of all trading transaction data, etc. Besides, the matchmaking mechanism of inventors and enterprises should be continuously optimized in order to find out suitable inventors and enterprises more efficiently and more accurately.
Second, the reputation evaluation system of the platform should be improved. On the one hand, a set of comprehensive reputation indicators should be introduced to evaluate trading behaviors of participants in patent commercialization, and the rules of reward and punishment can be set up to restrict behaviors of participants. On the other hand, an intelligent reputation monitoring system should be established. Under the premise of proper privacy protection, the reputation scores of participants should be made public.
Third, the design of two-stage contract should be optimized. The total payment of the two-stage contract should be seriously considered to ensure that both inventors and enterprises can obtain reasonable economic rewards. If the total payment of a two-stage contract is too high, it is easy to lead to the risk that an enterprise does not comply with the contract. And if the total payment of a two-stage contract is too low, it is easy to lead to the risk that an inventor does not follow the contract.
This paper explored the dynamic evolution process of tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization based on evolutionary game theory, which provides new perspectives and ideas for researches on patent commercialization, but there are still some areas for improvement and perfection. Tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization is a complex process, but only key influence factors are examined in this paper. Besides, government policies also affect participants′ behaviors in patent commercialization and simulation parameters are taken from limited sources at present.
Key words:patent commercialization; tacit knowledge sharing; evolutionary game; two-stage contract
引用本文：杨湘浩,叶旭,刘云等.专利商业化中隐性知识共享动态演化博弈研究[J].科研管理,2023,44(06):154-164.
转自：“科研管理”微信公众号
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